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I am cast on this panel as offering an economist’s view of the policy
lessons to be drawn from the income maintenance experiments. That
will be true enough if you take the word "an" seriously. I am in-
dubitably a card-carrying economist. But I have the feeling that -- on
these particular matters at least -- my views are not always those of the
typical economist. Part of the difference, but only part, arises because I
am primarily a macroeconomist, so I look at the questions now at hand
as a partial outsider.
Any time you are about to utter heresy it is a good idea to quote
some highly respectable authority. So let me remind you of something
John Stuart Mill wrote in the Preface to the Principles of Political Economy.
"Except on matters of mere detail, there are perhaps no practical ques-
tions, even among those which approach nearest to the character of
purely economical questions, which admit of being decided on
economical premises alone." Actually, I intend to go even further than
Mill: there are very few analytical questions about mass human
behavior which admit of being decided on economical premises alone.
And those few are not the ones we are dealing with at this conference.
The formal purpose of social experiments is to provide knowledge
about mass human behavior that will be useful in the design of policies.
So the lessons for policy depend on what we read the experiments as
saying about behavior. In commenting on that issue, I am drawing also
on my experience with other social experiments, in particular those deal-
ing with supported work and with various work-welfare schemes,
designed, conducted and analyzed by the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation.
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The surest generalization that emerges from all such experiments is
that the implications for mass human behavior are weak. That does not
mean they are not important; but they are uniformly weak. I use the
non-technical word "’weak" to cover a couple of distinct characteristics.
In the first place, statistically significant response-coefficients are hard to
come by. If there is any signal in the experimental results, it is rarely
audible above the noise. This is hardly surprising; it is a very common
outcome in cross-section studies with individuals as the unit of observa-
tion. No doubt it reflects both the inherent variability of each
individual’s behavior and the variation among individuals in their
average response above and beyond what can possibly be related to
observed and observable characteristics. Research workers usually get
their kicks from large t- and F-statistics, so this general lack of statistical
significance is usually a disappointment; but I think it has its policy
uses, as you will see. It might sometimes be possible to design an experi-
ment for adequate precision or power at some favored point in
parameter space. But that is hardly ever what we really want.
Even when a statistically significant response-coefficient surfaces it
is usually small. The elasticity of this with respect to that is rarely large
for the thises and thats we are concerned with. To take two examples:
(1) Gary Burtless shows convincingly that the labor-supply response to a
realistic negative income tax is in the expected direction but fairly small;
(2) in the supported-work experiments, even when a favorable post-
program response-coefficient could be estimated, as with the sub-
sample of mothers receiving aid to families with dependent children, it
was far from dramatic. Gains in employment and earnings were small,
but definite. I could document an analogous statement about the work-
welfare experiments Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation is
now doing. We are so accustomed to this sort of outcome that our first
reaction to a large statistically significant elasticity is to say: Wait a
minute; this must be spurious, the result of a misspecification. And
almost always we can convince ourselves that this skeptical reaction is
correct. I don’t find this sort of outcome terribly discouraging either. We
are talking about fairly commonplace aspects of behavior, not about
responses to exotic stimuli or extreme situations. If sharp responses
were to be expected we would already know about them; nobody
spends millions of dollars to verify the obvious. (It goes without saying
that sometimes common knowledge will be wrong and the obvious is
not only not obvious, but false. That’s life, but it does not undermine the
reason I gave for expecting small responses.)
If I am right about this, that the typical outcome of a social experi-
ment is some weak conclusions about response elasticities, it has an
important implication. The prevalence of small effects opens the way to
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adopted will depend a lot on the interpreter’s ideological and doctrinal
preconceptions and only a little on the detailed experimental results
themselves. It is the same principle that governs those personality tests
in which you are shown a picture of an ambiguous scene and different
people, interpreting the same picture, will tell you the story of their own
lives. Thus I think Gary Burtless hit the nail right on the head when he
concluded his survey of labor-supply responses by observing that
policymakers "seem far more impressed by our certainty that the effi-
ciency price of redistribution is positive than they are by the. equally per-
suasive evidence that the price is small." Because the price is small and
not well-defined, policymakers can find what they are looking for. We
all know what they are looking for these days.
One obvious reason for the prevalence of weak results is Mill’s dic-
tum. These experiments do not take place in a test-tube and they do not
involve identical individuals. There is just a lot more going on than can
possibly be controlled. And many of those things are not even
economical at all. I thought of this especially while reading Glen Cain’s
meticulous and carefully inconclusive evaluation of the well-known
findings about marital instability. Of course current and prospective
income under various circumstances is one of the forces pushing a
family one way or another. But there are many others, probably more
acute, impossible to measure and control for, and -- this is the important
point -- very likely correlated with some of the things we do measure,
but in complicated ways. Since those unmeasured forces necessarily get
parked in the noise, it is no wonder that clear, comprehensible, and
robust response-coefficients are hard to find in social experiments.
If the experiments usually offer little basis for discrimination among
quite different interpretations of the outcome, do they therefore offer no
lessons for policy? No, I don’t think that is the right conclusion to draw.
I think that the income maintenance experiments and others like them
tell us a lot about social policy, though maybe not the things we are
accustomed to look for. Once again it is Mill’s dictum that points the
way.
Why was there, back in the 1960s and 1970s, a brief flicker of interest
in the negative income tax, intense enough to give rise to expensive
experiments? It is hard to think back across the ethical desert that is
American national government today, but I think I remember some of
the reasons. There was a feeling that we were at last in a position to
eliminate poverty, that it was the right thing to do, and that the direct
way to do it was to transfer income directly to people who would other-
wise be very poor. This was combined with a feeling that the existing
hodgepodge of categorical transfer programs involved the bureaucracy
deeply, meanly, and inefficiently in running the lives of the recipients.
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effect of inducing two-parent families to split up. This strand could be
thought to fall under the second category of reasons, but it was promi-
nent enough to be worth independent status. The negative income tax
seemed to be a way of fixing all of these things at once, and doing it
through a bureaucracy with which everybody was involved. It attracted
people at both ends of the normal political spectrum. This may have
been very important at the time. After all, we didn’t get a negative in-
come tax, just some experiments. The unusual sight of Milton Friedman
and James Tobin agreeing (but not really) about something could help
bring that about. I think Wildavsky’s categorization of the political spec-
trum is too ad hoc to be fundamentally useful; but I also think he cap-
tures a lot of what was going on in this particular episode.
The one possible hitch was the fear that a decent guaranteed income
level, combined with the high tax rates necessary to keep from transfer-
ring a lot of money to people above the poverty line, would induce
many recipients to withdraw from work. That outcome would fit badly
with a very important strand of the American ethic. The experiments
were designed primarily to test that possibility. (At least so it seems to
me. I may here be exhibiting the economist’s occupational bias.)
If that is what the experiments were about, they did provide
something of an answer. There is a labor supply effect, as every
economist thought there would be; but it could hardly be described as
large enough to jeopardize the work ethic. Besides, the inducement to
withdraw from the labor force seemed to be stronger among women
than among men; it might easily have weakened over time as women
generally have become increasingly involved in the world of work. A
culture that can pat itself on the back unceasingly after having gone
seven years with an unemployment rate higher than 7 percent can hard-
ly complain that its foundations are being eroded by so small a
withdrawal from the labor force. There is no particular reason to sup-
pose that a return of those lost souls to the labor force would have
increased employment perceptibly under current conditions.
The possible effects on marital instability are some cause for alarm,
though Glen Cain makes one wonder if they are real. No one would
want the transfer mechanism to contribute to the breakup of marriages.
By the way, is there any reason to connect any measured increase in
marital splits with the negative income tax mechanism itself, as distinct
from the change in current and expected disposable income? If the
couples that did split had encountered the same income possibilities in
the private market, would they have split up? There is no merit in in-
sisting that the transfer mechanism keep couples together who want to
break up for other reasons, and do so by inflicting unnecessary poverty
on them. The negative income tax experiments may not have been caus-
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Maybe this view of the experiments provides a model for social ex-
periments in general. Suppose society wants to do something because it
is the right thing to do, not for purely economical reasons. There will
sometimes be economical doubts, worries that doing the right thing
might be unsuspectedly costly. A well-designed experiment can help
find out, and the prevalence of weak results is not an obstacle. It only
means that a lot of the time the experiment will tell us that, for all the
reasons discussed earlier, the kinds of changes we contemplate will not
turn the world upside down. Many of the most important things people
do they do for reasons that have little to do with the price mechanism. I
think that the great shift in educated opinion, away from belief in in-
come maintenance-type solutions toward belief in multi-part tailored,
work-related programs, had little to do with the outcome of the negative
income tax experiments. The generic fact that results are weak merely
permits the social consensus to work itself out and to convert the
research community without undue strain on its conscience. It must also
be remembered that the nature of the poverty problem seems to have
changed during 20 years and that should change the preferred
solutions.
I should add that experiments have the added advantage of pro-
viding some information about the system’s capacity to administer and
operate a new policy mechanism. This is important; it is something that
the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation has always paid a
lot of attention to in its experiments and demonstrations.
The main disadvantage of the social experiment as a policy tool is
that it may often leave us having to explain to ourselves why we do not
do the right thing, when it is costly but not terribly costly. But that is not
a serious problem either. One of the things Americans are best at is
kidding themselves along.Discussion
Edward M. Gramlich *
I would have thought that this conference would commemorate the
income maintenance experiments, but in fact the experiments have
taken quite a beating. Yesterday Arnold Zellner made extensive
criticisms of their statistical properties. Today Lee Rainwater criticized
their initial conception, method, and policy interpretation. Elmore
found the notion that policy experiments of this sort could be used to
leverage policy support patently absurd. Nathan feels that neither the
negative income tax nor the experiments with it were well-advised.
Robert Solow’s paper was also critical of the experiments. When he
wrote it, he probably thought that his paper was being too critical, and
he was quite apologetic. But compared to the others, Solow’s paper is
mild. To quote another famous social philosopher (Solow himself, in his
1974 Ely lecture), he must have felt "like a nice independent rat, trotting
down to the sea, and suddenly discovering that he’s a lemming.’"
Solow is only rarely a lemming, a feeling I have much more ex-
perience with. Today, however, I want to try to play the rat and stick up
for the experiments. I begin with a standard Robert Hall proposed
yesterday when he suggested that the experiments be compared to what
the government was doing at the time. Hall compared the experiments
to the Post Office, which seems like a cheap shot. But we could compare
the experiments to other major social experiment efforts of the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) at the time. There were three altogether.
One, on educational performace contracting, tested a policy that soon
became viewed as a failure, using an experiment that was very flawed
but ultimately arrived at useful "nail in the coffin" type data because of
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the well-known inadvertent finding. That finding was that it became
very hard for OEO to litigate the performance contracting claims with
private companies, raising the ugly spectre of small school districts try-
ing to fight it out with the legal departments of national teaching com-
panies. Another, for educational vouchers, never even got off the
ground because OEO could not find any school boards interested in con-
ducting an experiment. The third, the negative income tax, was at the
time viewed as the jewel in OEO’s crown. The experiment was working,
and the policy was interesting to many people, even some who were not
economists. In this sense, while we can look back, rub our beards, and
pronounce the negative income tax a failure, we should give the experi-
ment its due -- unlike the others, it at least lived on to get roasted 20
years later.
But the experiment did more than that. There are basically two
reasons why many are now pronouncing the experiment a failure:
1) the research was inconclusive;
2) interest in the policy under investigation waned.
Yesterday we discussed the first reason extensively, and I take it by now
the consensus is that not all the research was inconclusive, and that it is
pretty hard even to imagine what conclusive research would be on mat-
ters such as marital splits. Today we are talking about the second issue,
one on which.I would like to spend most of my time.
The reason why interest in the negative income tax as a policy op-
tion has waned also brings up Solow’s remark about the "ethical desert
that is the American national government today." (Since I am now part
of that national government, this remark does put me in an awkward
position.) Back in 1970, and probably also today, Solow would have
voted for a pure negative income tax without any work requirement
because "it was the right thing to do." A decent negative income tax
would cost about $20 billion, $100 per capita, about one-fifth of what the
average American spends on voluntary charity these days. Most people
give to charity without any effective monitoring for leaky buckets, and
one would think we could do the same for income transfers. Solow
appears to adopt this line of reasoning when he calls income main-
tenance the right thing to do. I certainly agreed with him back in 1970,
and would still today but for another problem that I was not then very
sensitive to: unfortunately, a pretty basic problem.
Theorists rationalize the existence of income transfers in the first
place on the basis of taxpayer-donors’ altruistic motive. But any altruist
knows that one important thing to worry about is free riding: if there is
some other altruist willing to make support payments, an altruist can
free ride, see the donation given, and save his money.
It takes just a slight extension of this logic to realize that with income
support payments, there is a potential free rider -- the recipient himself.DISCUSSION 225
It may be that free riding is minor, that it is not costly to the donor, and
that leaks in the bucket are modest. But if free riding exists at all, it can
be tremendously destructive. The donor-taxpayer is working a little bit
harder to support a poor person, and here we have the poor person
working a little bit less. Any donor-taxpayer, even a very ethical one, is
likely to become so enraged by such an outcome that he may cut off all
support. And even if he does not, his democratically elected representa-
tive might be inclined to. And even if that representative does not, he
may have to run against an opponent who could make hay out of the
issue. When all is said and done, income support under those terms will
probably be very limited.
This, I think, is what blew the pure negative income tax out of the
water politically. Unless donors could assure themselves that respon-
sibility for supporting recipients would be shared by recipients
themselves, in the form of work requirements, child support enforce-
ment, and other things that sounded punitive back in 1970, they are
simply not interested. And it is not even unethical for them to be
uninterested. This is why, I think, Nathan tells us that politicians did
not like the pure negative income tax even in 1970, and Burtless tells us
that politicians are more impressed by the positive price than by the
small price. And this is why I also think we should stop talking about
ethical deserts. They may not be ethical deserts after all, and whatever
they are, they have been around for a while.
I should point out that by responsibility-sharing, I do mean sharing.
Unlike Charles Murray, I do not think that poor people need to provide
all of their own support. There can be altruism, and it can be highly
satisfying to donors as long as donors perceive that poor people are
doing their share. And such a feeling is probably best for the long-run
self-esteem of the poor too, another important value that should not be
ignored.
Unlike all pessimists who are down on both the negative income tax
and experiments with it, this notion of responsibility-sharing shows me
a silver lining in all these gray clouds surrounding the world of income
support these days. It is just possible that national policy, nudged along
by state governments (the true social laboratories) and even unwittingly
by the Reagan administration (mainly in the form of enabling legislation
passed in 1981), is evolving a successful income support strategy that
contains heavy doses of responsibility-sharing. States are more and
more requiring welfare recipients to work or search for jobs as a condi-
tion of getting benefits. They are also en. forcing child support obligations
on absent fathers. Both make sense in terms of responsibility-sharing;
the first may even pass the Manpower Demonstration Research Cor-
poration’s benefit-cost test, and evidence indicates that it is viewed as
fair by recipients.226 Edward M. Gramlich
Once the perception that welfare involves responsibility-sharing
takes hold, we may even see governors begin to bring welfare out of the
closet and brag about their "humane and responsible" approaches to
the problem. One such governor is in the state just south of us, Dukakis
of Massachusetts. And with governors and other politicians talking up
this new view of public assistance, these programs may begin to grow in
popularity, and real benefit levels may even stop losing ground.
There is a silver lining for social experiments too. The Manpower
Demonstration Research Corporation’s interesting and successful evalu-
ations of employment for welfare recipients have somehow managed to
take root in this desert. They have benefited technically and administra-
tively from earlier experiments with the negative income tax, and they
now have the huge political advantage that their policies under investi-
gation seem to be popular and have stayed so, seemingly because they
have worked out the sharing of responsibility more satisfactorily. To re-
spond to those who proposed retrospectively a resident anthropologist,
we now even have at least one new large-scale project, by Bill Wilson at
Chicago, that combines survey and ethnographic work. Hence for all the
mistakes made by the earlier generation of social experimenters, and all
the bad political luck that was suffered, we might even be getting
another chance. Let’s hope things work out better this second time
around.